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We investigate whether business ties with portfolio firms influence mutual funds’ proxy
voting using a comprehensive data set spanning 2003 to 2011. In contrast to prior lit-
erature, we find that business ties significantly influence pro-management voting at
the level of individual pairs of fund families and firms after controlling for ISS recom-
mendations and holdings. The association is significant only for shareholder-sponsored
proposals and stronger for those that pass or fail by relatively narrow margins. Our
findings are consistent with a demand-driven model of biased voting in which company
managers use existing business ties with funds to influence how they vote.
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Mutual funds are of great importance to both retail investors and corporations. They are
the main investment vehicle for retail investors, not least via their role in managing pension
portfolios through 401(K) plans. They are also highly relevant to corporate governance as
they collectively own 24% of U.S. corporate equity1 and large fund families hold blocks of
10% or more in dozens of large U.S. corporations (Davis and Yoo (2003)). Since the passage
of shareholder proposals raises firm value (Cun˜at, Gine, and Guadalupe (2012)), if mutual
funds vote their proxies in a manner that enhances the value of portfolio firms,2 they would
not only play a beneficial role in corporate governance, but also enrich their vast base of
retail clients. The proxy voting behavior of mutual funds is thus of considerable importance.
However, mutual funds often have lucrative business relationships with portfolio firms
arising from the management of the same 401(K) plans that enhance their importance to
retail investors. On average, earnings from 401(K)-related business equal 14% of the revenues
that mutual fund families earn from their equity funds, and such income can represent as
much as 25% of fund family revenues (Davis and Kim (2007)). Since the choice of fiduciaries
for 401(K) plans lies in the hands of firm executives who may be opposed to shareholder
activism, there has been widespread suspicion that mutual funds may vote their proxies in
a conflicted manner. For example, according to the SEC:3
“...in some situations the interests of a mutual fund’s shareholders may con-
flict with those of its investment adviser with respect to proxy voting. This may
occur, for example, when a fund’s adviser also manages... the retirement plan
assets of a company whose securities are held by the fund. In these situations, a
fund’s adviser may have an incentive to support management recommendations
to further its business interests.”
In response to such concerns, in 2003 the SEC adopted Rule 30b1-4 of the Investment Com-
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panies Act, which requires mutual funds to annually disclose their votes cast for proposals
arising in portfolio companies. As a result, it is now possible to investigate the extent to
which business ties with portfolio firms affect mutual fund proxy voting. We examine this
relationship over the 2003 to 2011 period.
We show that mutual funds’ voting is significantly influenced by their business ties with
portfolio firms. Since we control for unobserved heterogeneity using a rich set of fixed ef-
fects, our result holds for given pairs of fund families and firms, even at the level of individual
proposals, and after controlling for Institutional Shareholder Services’ (ISS) recommenda-
tions and holdings. Our finding stands in sharp contrast to prior literature (Davis and Kim
(2007), Ashraf, Jayaraman, and Ryan (2012)) which finds that business ties with portfolio
firms do not influence voting after controlling for fund family heterogeneity. We discuss the
connection to these papers in greater detail below.
Proposals can be sponsored either by management (insiders) or by shareholders (out-
siders). In the full sample, we find a robust incremental effect of business ties on pro-
management voting for shareholder proposals relative to management proposals. When we
split the sample by sponsorship, we find that the association between ties and voting only ob-
tains for shareholder proposals. Viewed in light of canonical models of corporate governance,
which hold that outsiders attempt to mitigate rent extraction by insiders, the possibility that
management may use business ties to obstruct shareholder activism is of particular interest.
We develop a simple model that provides a theoretical foundation for the incremental
effect identified above. In our model, shareholder and management proposals are distin-
guished by the degree to which company managers have control: managers can withdraw or
modify problematic self-sponsored proposals (Listokin (2008)) but have less control over the
specifics of shareholder proposals, which typically arise as the result of a breakdown in soft
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engagement between managers and shareholders (Gantchev (2013), McCahery, Sautner, and
Starks (2016)). Managers receive information on the anticipated support for each proposal.
If a proposal is formally introduced, they have the option to try to influence the voting of
institutional blockholders. Managers are best able to influence those institutions with which
they have ongoing business relationships, but exerting influence is costly because it requires
effort and credible threats of future punishment. Accordingly, managers exert influence only
when doing so is worth paying this cost. The model predicts that managers influence voting
more frequently for shareholder proposals than for management proposals, thus providing an
explanation for the empirical finding above: the flexibility and control that managers have
over self-sponsored proposals raises the bar for paying the cost of exerting influence.
Our model also sheds further light on the relationship between proxy voting and business
ties. It predicts that managers are more likely to influence voting, ex ante, for shareholder
proposals that pass or fail narrowly (i.e., that are contested), ex post. Since managers receive
information on anticipated support, the fact that these proposals pass or fail narrowly ex
post implies that managers can predict ex ante that these proposals are “in play.” It is for
precisely these proposals that it is worth paying the cost of exerting influence. We empirically
examine the incremental effect of business ties on proxy voting on shareholder proposals that
pass or fail by relatively narrow margins and find strong support for the model’s prediction.
The effect is also economically relevant: in our most saturated specification, we find that
a shift from no business ties to some business ties leads to an increase in pro-management
voting of over 12% for proposals that pass or fail by less than 20%.
Our analysis of contested proposals is of independent interest because it allows us to
pinpoint the conflict of interest confronting mutual fund families with business ties. While
individual fund families cannot be pivotal for proposals that pass or fail by wide margins,
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the same may not be true for contested proposals. Further, the passage of a proposal is
likely to enhance the market value of the firm on the day of the vote precisely when the
proposal is contested, because in such cases the voting outcome may not be fully anticipated
by the market (Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006)). Thus, it is for contested proposals that
the trade-off between value enhancement and business ties is salient: by voting for the
proposal, the fund-family may be instrumental in raising firm (and, in turn, portfolio) value
but displease management and be exposed to a reduction in business ties. The fact that we
find an incremental effect of proposal contestedness on biased voting suggests that mutual
fund families choose business ties over portfolio value when it matters.
Our model highlights the demand side of biased voting: managers wary of losing a
vote use business ties as leverage to obtain support from institutional investors. But could
the desirability of revenues from future business ties lead funds without business ties to
voluntarily vote in a more pro-management manner? To investigate this question, we first
show that pension management contracts are typically awarded to the largest fund families.
This implies that small funds without business ties should be less inclined to voluntarily
vote pro-management than large funds without business ties: even conditional on being
pro-management, their chances of being rewarded with business ties is smaller than for
large funds. We find that there is no such difference. Instead, conditional on the existence
of business ties, larger fund families vote significantly more pro-management than smaller
fund families. These results support the primacy of a demand-driven mechanism for biased
proxy voting. To investigate further, we next run Granger causality tests and find that
lagged business ties are significantly associated with future pro-management voting, but not
vice versa. Clearly, our regressions cannot formally establish the direction of causality. At
the broadest level, we are agnostic about the precise direction of causality for biased voting
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within sponsor-provider relationships—in our view, both causal directions imply qualitatively
similar negative economic consequences.
As noted above, our results stand in sharp contrast to prior literature. Davis and Kim
(2007) use the first available year of data on mutual fund proxy votes (June 2003 to July
2004) and find that, for a given proposal, fund voting is not influenced by business ties
although fund families with higher levels of business ties support management to a greater
extent in all portfolio firms irrespective of business ties. Their analysis is restricted to
six shareholder proposals, selected on the basis of the Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009)
entrenchment index and the frequency of occurrence in their data set. In a recent study,
Ashraf, Jayaraman, and Ryan (2012) use data on executive compensation proposals between
January 2004 and June 2006 and confirm the findings of Davis and Kim (2007). In particular,
they find that business ties do not influence voting at the level of individual proposals after
controlling for fund family heterogeneity. The contrast between our conclusion and that of
these earlier papers should be viewed in the context of several differences. First, we work
with a much larger data set, combining over a nine-year period four databases containing
(i) the votes cast by each mutual fund on each proposal of each portfolio firm, (ii) voting
outcomes, (iii) business relationships between firms and funds, and (iv) fund family holdings.
Second, while prior literature focuses on particular proposals, we consider a wide swathe
of proposals.4 Finally, the richness of our data set allows us to aggressively control for
unobserved heterogeneity using a variety of fixed effects, which is not feasible in prior work
due to data limitations.
Our paper also relates to a broader literature. Hamdani and Yafeh (2012) analyse Israeli
data to study the governance role of institutional investors in settings in which ownership is
concentrated and business groups are common. They find that institutions owned by a public
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company are more likely to support company-sponsored proposals. Other papers examining
business ties and proxy voting include Cremers and Romano (2011), who consider the effect of
mandatory disclosure on mutual fund voting, and Rothberg and Lilien (2006). Our findings
also complement papers that show how business ties affect aspects of mutual fund behavior
other than proxy voting. For instance, Cohen and Schmidt (2009) show that trustee fund
families overweight holdings of sponsor firms and do not sell in response to negative shocks,
while Duan, Hotchkiss, and Jiao (2011) argue that business ties provide information to
mutual funds and influence their trading profits in related stocks. Our paper also bears a
connection to Matvos and Ostrovsky (2010), who analyze strategic considerations in mutual
fund voting abstracting from business ties. At the most general level, our paper relates
to the role of blockholders in corporate governance (see Edmans (2013) for a survey) and
the emerging literature on how the incentives of institutional blockholders affect governance
(e.g., Dasgupta and Piacentino (2015)).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the data and
sample construction while Section II offers a first look at business ties and voting. Section
III presents a model that is the basis for further hypothesis development. Sections IV and V
test the model’s main hypotheses. In Section VI we consider the possibility of management
friendliness without business ties while Section VII discusses causality versus correlation.
Section VIII concludes.
I. Data
Since 2003 the SEC has required all mutual funds registered in the U.S. to report their
proxy votes in all shareholder meetings of portfolio companies using Form N-PX. We obtain
proxy voting data from the ISS Voting Analytics database. The full database contains votes
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cast by mutual funds on all proposals for every Russell 3000 company from 2003 to 2011.
Mutual funds are required to submit N-PX forms annually by August 31. The reported
votes cover the period from July 1 of the previous year to June 30 of the current year. For
each proposal, funds report the firm, the meeting date, a short description of the proposal
(e.g., declassify the board of directors, reduce supermajority voting requirement, etc.), the
sponsor of the proposal (management or shareholder), management’s recommendation, the
ISS recommendation, and the fund’s vote. We supplement our voting data with ISS Voting
Results, which includes the votes cast in favor, the shareholder base for the voting result,
and the voting result for each proposal.
We hand-collect data on 401(k) retirement plans sponsored by publicly traded firms from
Forms 5500 filed with the Department of Labor (DOL). These data provide us with detailed
information on any business relationship between a firm and a fund pertaining to the firm’s
pension plan (e.g., investment advisor, trustee, investment manager, etc). Any firm that
sponsors an employee benefit plan that qualifies under ERISA Sections 104 or 4065 must file
Form 5500 with the DOL. Benefits provided by a firm’s plan include pension and welfare
benefits.5
Finally, we merge the mutual fund voting data from ISS Voting Analytics/Voting Results
with the Form 5500 data and mutual fund family holdings data obtained from SEC Form
13F filings. Due to the lack of a unique common mutual fund (or family) identifier across
the three databases, we merge the three data sets using a combination of a name-matching
algorithm and proprietary fund family identifiers. In our final data set we aggregate votes
at the fund family level and drop any individual fund level information, thus keeping only
one fund family per proposal observation. Table
I hereTable I summarizes the sample characteristics. Panel A shows that our merged data set
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contains 1,131,240 votes cast by individual funds which results in 171,473 aggregated votes
cast by the 29 largest fund families that voted in 17,618 proposals at the shareholder meetings
of 3,121 firms from 2003 to 2011. In Panel B, we can see that of the sample proposals,
79% are sponsored by management and the rest are sponsored by shareholders.6 Panel C
shows that the proportion of funds within the average family that vote with management’s
recommendation on the average proposal in our sample is 77.12%. The corresponding median
is 100% implying that most funds in a fund family vote in unison. Around 94% of our
observations on the proportion of funds voting with management on a given proposal are
either zero or a hundred.
Table I, Panel D reports compensation statistics. The DOL’s Form 5500 has several
components. While all firms sponsoring ERISA-qualifying employee benefit plans file Form
5500 Schedule A, they also file Schedules C or D if their plans have 100 or more participants
in which the service provider was paid from the plan’s assets and fees exceed $5,000. Schedule
C reports both direct and indirect compensation, which are defined as plan service provider
salary and fees, respectively. Schedule D reports plan assets under management. We define
total compensation received by fund families for services rendered in relation to 401(k) plans
as the sum of direct and indirect compensation and 0.5% of assets under management.7
In our sample, 95.9% of firm×family×year triples have no compensation data. For these
observations we set total compensation to zero. In the rest of our sample, the average
(median) total compensation is $2.25 million ($220,000). To ensure that the high number of
zero-compensation observations is not a result of matching error, we manually inspect the
data for firms that, in addition to reporting Schedule A, report Schedule C or D. We find that
the firms that file Schedule C or D also report strictly positive total compensation values.
This suggests that the zero-compensation values come from firms filing only Schedule A, and
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thus derive from firm×family×year triples characterized by small or nonexistent business ties.
Panel E of Table I reports that the average (median) dollar amount of fund family holdings
in portfolio firms is $101.07 million ($11.5 million). In Panel F, we find that the average
(median) fraction of equity fund revenue for fund families attributable to pensions-related
compensation is 13.94% (4.17%). Table
II hereTable II summarizes the nature of business relationships between fund families and firms
in Panel A, management and ISS recommendations as well as fund voting choices in Panel
B, and voting results in Panel C. The five most common types of business relationship
are contract administrator (average total compensation $5.58 million), record keeping ($2.01
million), investment management ($9.51 million), and trustee and investment advisory ($22.4
million).
Panel B shows that management recommends in favor of 78.64% of all proposals, 99.86%
of management-sponsored proposals (“withholding” in the remaining 0.14%), and 0.72% of
shareholder-sponsored proposals. ISS recommends in favor of 80.13% of all proposals, 84.76%
of management proposals, and 63.11% of shareholder proposals. The ISS recommendation
coincides with management’s in 74.61% of all proposals, 84.73% of management proposals,
and 37.44% of shareholder proposals. Fund families vote with management’s recommenda-
tion in 77.12% of all proposals, 82.94% of management proposals, and 64.09% of shareholder
proposals, while they vote with the ISS recommendation in 82.16% of all proposals, 87.20%
of management proposals, and 70.87% of shareholder proposals.
Proposals, Proposal Categories, and Proposal Types: Before proceeding to the main anal-
ysis, we introduce some useful terminology here. Given that our focus is on voting, a key
object of interest is a proposal. In our formal analysis, we denote proposals by p. Each p is
a unique identifier for a proposal that arises in a shareholder meeting of firm i at time t.8 It
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is also useful to attach two further descriptors to proposals.
First, each proposal can be described according to the nature of (ex ante) sponsorship or
(ex post) support as belonging to some category. There are two categories by sponsorship:
management proposals and shareholder proposals. In Section V and thereafter, we further
refine the space of categories to include labels related to ex post support (contested or
uncontested).
Second, each proposal can be characterized in terms of its function, which we refer to
as the proposal’s type. The ISS provides a list of 257 proposal types by function (e.g.,
“Approve/Amend Executive Incentive Bonus (M0535)” or “Declassify the Board of Directors
(S0201)”). We refer to the ISS functional classification for each proposal as its “Proposal
Type ISS,” and label it in our formal analysis by zISS. Unlike proposals, which are indexed
by firm and time, proposal categories and types are not firm and time specific. To illustrate,
consider the following example. Proposal p = 6471494 in the firm Hilton Hotels Corporation,
which was voted on at a meeeting held on May 26, 2005 (i.e., t = 2005), has proposal type
ISS zISS = S0212 (i.e., “Require a Majority Vote for the Election of Directors”) and, as a
shareholder-sponsored proposal, belongs to the category “shareholder proposals”.9
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II. Business Ties and Proxy Voting: A First Look
We begin our empirical analysis as follows. For each fund family f voting in a shareholder
meeting of portfolio firm i on proposal p at time t, we estimate the following specification:
VoteswithManagementf,i,p,t = α + β1BusinessTiesMeasuref,i,t+
+ β2LogHoldingsf,i,t + β3ISSRecommendation i,p,t+
+ γi × µf +

·
pizISS
pip︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fixed Effects Terms
+ εf,i,p,t.
(1a)
(1b)
(1c)
Our main dependent variable is the proportion of mutual funds j belonging to fund family
f that voted in line with management’s recommendation on proposal p put forward at the
date t shareholder meeting of the fund family’s portfolio firm i. This variable is defined as
VoteswithManagementf,i,p,t =
∑J
j=1
(
FundvotewithManagement j,f,i,p,t
)
J
× 100,
where FundvotewithManagement j,f,i,p,t = 1 if fund j from family f votes in line with the
management recommendation on proposal p at the shareholder meeting of portfolio firm i
at time t and J is the total number of funds per family f voting on that proposal.
Throughout our analysis we use two key measures of business ties. The first is LogTotal -
Compensationf,i,t, which is a continuous measure of the magnitude of business ties as ob-
tained from the Form 5500 filings. These data are obtained at the individual fund level
from the Form 5500 filings and then aggregated to produce a family-level measure of total
compensation. Our second measure is the dummy variable BTDummyf,i,t, which is equal to
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one if total compensation is positive and zero otherwise.
We control for two potentially important effects. Cohen and Schmidt (2009) establish that
there is a positive correlation between the compensation received by mutual fund families and
their stock holdings in portfolio firms. To control for the size of mutual fund family holdings
in their portfolio firms and for the positive relationship between total compensation received
and the size of fund family holdings, we include the (natural) logarithm of holdings in our
regression, LogHoldingsf,i,t. Our other control, ISSRecommendation i,p,t, is a dummy variable
that takes the value of one if the voting recommendation of ISS is in favor of management.
Matvos and Ostrovsky (2010) show that including the ISS recommendation may control for
a potentially important part of a mutual fund’s information about the quality and type of
the proposal being voted on.
The richness of our panel data allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity along
firm, fund family, and time dimensions using a variety of fixed effects. All three of our
specifications have firm×family (γi × µf ) fixed effects. Specification (1a) has no additional
fixed effects, so that β1 measures the effect of business ties for a given firm×family pair on
voting across all proposals. Specification (1b) adds Proposal Type ISS fixed effects (pizISS),
so that β1 measures the effect of business ties for a given firm×family pair on voting across
proposals of the same Proposal Type ISS (e.g., S0212).10 Specification (1c) instead adds
proposal fixed effects, so that β1 measures the effect of business ties for a given firm×family
pair on voting on a particular proposal (e.g., 6471494). Table
III
here
The results are reported in Table III. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic-
ity and clustered along the family×year dimension. Across our specifications, business ties
significantly affect the degree of pro-management voting by mutual fund families on proxy
proposals in portfolio firms. For example, our most saturated specification, reported in
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columns 3 and 6, produces a coefficient of 0.212 significant at the 5% level for the continuous
measure of business ties and a coefficient of 2.214 significant at the 10% level for the discrete
measure. Further, the coefficient on LogHoldingsf,i,t is positive and significant in each specifi-
cation, suggesting a positive relationship between the size of fund family holdings and voting,
that is due in part to the positive association between holdings and compensation (Cohen
and Schmidt (2009)). As expected, the coefficient on ISSRecommendation i,p,t is positive and
significant as this is one of the main determinants of how fund families vote. However, our
results show that business ties affect voting above and beyond that recommendation.11
The results of Davis and Kim (2007) and Ashraf, Jayaraman, and Ryan (2012) suggest
that, controlling for heterogeneity across fund families, mutual fund proxy voting does not
depend on business ties. This finding is in sharp contrast to our results since all our specifi-
cations include—at a minimum—fund family fixed effects. Hence, the issue is of a different
nature than previously believed. To facilitate comparison, we replicate our analysis for the
proposals used by Davis and Kim (2007) and Ashraf, Jayaraman, and Ryan (2012). This
material can be found in Internet Appendix Section I.A. Table
IV
here
Our results so far mask some significant heterogeneity. At the broadest level, proposals
may be sponsored either by insiders (management) or by outsiders (shareholders), generating
two mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories. When we split our analysis into these two
categories, we find stark differences between the two. The results are reported in Table IV.
For shareholder proposals, in our most saturated specification, namely, Specification (1c),
the coefficient for the continuous measure is 0.353 (significant at the 5% level) and that for
the discrete measure is 3.917 (significant at the 10% level). The corresponding coefficients for
management proposals are -0.067 ( insignificant) and -0.739 (insignificant).12 What drives
such heterogeneity between management and shareholder proposals? In the next section,
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we develop a simple model to examine this question. We then use the model to develop
hypotheses for further empirical investigation.13
While our dependent variable is not binary, its realized distribution is bimodal. Thus,
for completeness, we reestimate the main specifications above using conditional logit models.
This analysis is reported in Internet Appendix Table IA.II and demonstrates the robustness
of our key findings.14
III. Shareholder and Management Proposals: Theory
Proposals for corporate change may affect the payoffs of both management and share-
holders. To focus on actions taken by management to influence voting, we index proposals
by their incremental effect on management payoffs.15 In particular, we index proposals by
the variable v, which is distributed on [−V, V ] via a continuous CDF H with associated pdf
h that (for simplicity) is symmetric around zero. Proposals may be sponsored by managers
or shareholders. Management-sponsored proposals are characterized by v > 0. Motivated
by standard agency models of corporate governance (e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)) we
assume that shareholder-sponsored proposals are characterized by v < 0.16
Once a proposal has been formulated, managers are able estimate its anticipated support
among shareholders by canvassing them (Listokin (2008)). We model the anticipated support
for a proposal by the random variable SA ∈ [0, 1], with CDF G and associated pdf g. The
variable SA is the proportion of voting shares, normalized by the required shareholder base
for that proposal, that are expected to support the proposal. Since this initial information
is noisy, the realized support is given by SR = SA + , where  is distributed on [−δ, δ]
according to some symmetric unimodal density f with f (−δ) = f (δ) = 0.17 The parameter
δ > 0 measures canvassing noise.18 We assume that δ < 1
2
, that is, canvassing is not radically
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inaccurate. We then have that, without loss of generality, any proposal is (i) a “sure thing,”
that is, SA − δ ≥ 12 , (ii) a “lost cause,” that is, SA + δ < 12 , or (iii) “contestable,” that
is, SA − δ < 12 ≤ SA + δ. To avoid a plethora of qualitatively similar cases, we make the
following assumption.
Assumption 1: Contestable proposals are characterized by SA =
1
2
.
Intuitively, Assumption 1 implies that managers treat all contestable proposals in the
same way.19 While this simplifies our analysis, it does not change the qualitative results.
Once a formal proposal has been introduced, managers may exert influence on block-
holders with whom they have business connections to vote in line with the management
recommendation. Business connections foster familiarity and thus provide a basis for credi-
ble communication between managers and institutional blockholders, enabling managers to
meaningfully threaten to punish (or promise to reward) blockholders in the future. We there-
fore model the emergence of pro-management voting as a management-driven process. In
Sections VI and VII we present evidence consistent with this view. The exertion of influence
changes the voting of blockholders with business ties in favor of the management recommen-
dation and results in a change in the distribution of the realized support. Managers can
influence for (ρ = 1) or against (ρ = −1), generating (transformed) realized support:
ŜR = SA + ̂,
where
 ̂ is distributed on [0, δ] according to density f̂ if ρ = 1̂ is distributed on [−δ, 0] according to density f̂ if ρ = −1 ,
and f̂ is symmetric unimodal and satisfies f̂ (−δ) = f̂(0) = f̂ (δ) = 0. In words, influence
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shifts support in favor of management in a first-order stochastic dominance sense. Influence
is costly for management because it requires effort and credible threats of future punishment.
The cost, kp (SA), may depend on anticipated support.
20 We assume that kp (SA) > 0 for
all SA. Thus, kp
(
1
2
)
> 0 represents the cost of exerting influence on contestable proposals.
Finally, management loses face when a vote goes against its recommendation, in which case
it suffers cost kd, some (unmodeled) reputational loss from defeat.
Management-sponsored proposals: For management proposals, we denote the noise pa-
rameter by δM . Managers have latitude on self-sponsored proposals. Upon learning SA they
can decide whether to present or withdraw the proposal. Even if they choose to present
the proposal, they can modify it such that it is more palatable to investors. Modification is
costly, however, particularly for proposals that are highly opposed and lucrative to manage-
ment (i.e., extract the highest rents). We assume that it is impossible to recast lost causes
(which can never be made to “look good” to shareholders) and that the cost of recasting a
contestable proposal into a sure thing is proportionate to the rents that management extracts
via the proposal, that is, a contestable proposal with value v can be recast at cost mv for
m ∈ (0, 1/2) into a sure thing that pays managers (1−m) v.
Lemma 1: Managers exert positive influence (ρ = 1) if and only if the proposal is contestable
and v >
kp(
1
2
)
m
.
All proofs are in the Appendix. Managers do not exert influence on sure things (un-
necessary) or on lost causes (pointless). On contestable proposals, managers can modify
the proposal (and convert it into a sure thing) or present an unmodified proposal. Valu-
able proposals are more costly to modify. For these proposals, managers find it optimal to
forgo modification and exert influence to win instead. In line with this view, Listokin (2008)
finds that of those rare management proposals that are contested, the majority are executive
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compensation proposals and thus of direct value to managers.
Shareholder sponsored proposals: We envisage a two-stage process in the formation of a
shareholder proposal. In the first stage, a shareholder may propose some change. Managers
can then accept and implement the shareholder’s suggestion (in which case a shareholder
proposal is unnecessary) or reject it, in which case the shareholder brings the proposal for-
ward. Thus the introduction of a shareholder proposal is usually a consequence of a failure of
“behind the scenes” activism as documented by Karpoff (2001), Gantchev (2013), and McC-
ahery, Sautner, and Starks (2016) among others. In our sample, management recommends in
favor of only 0.72% of shareholder proposals (see Table II, Panel B). Given a shareholder pro-
posal, managers obtain information on anticipated support. The noise in predicting support
is given by δS ∈ [δM , 1
2
)
. It is natural to assume that support is (weakly) less predictable
for shareholder proposals than for management proposals.21 Further, unlike self-sponsored
proposals, managers do not have the option to withdraw or modify the proposal—their only
choice is whether to exert influence to avoid defeat.
Lemma 2: Managers exert negative influence (ρ = −1) if and only if the proposal is con-
testable and v < − (2kp(12)− kd).
Exerting influence is only worthwhile for contestable proposals and then only if the cost
to management of the proposal passing is high. Lemmas 1 and 2 jointly imply the following
result.
Proposition 1: Managers choose to exert influence with higher probability for shareholder
proposals than for management proposals.
Since managers can avoid exerting influence by withdrawing or modifying their own
proposals, the bar for paying the cost of influence is high. For shareholder proposals, however,
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influence is management’s only tool once a proposal is introduced. The bar for exerting
influence is lower. Further, when support for shareholder proposals is less predictable than
for management proposals (δS ≥ δM), the former are more likely to be contestable than the
latter. These ingredients (withdrawal, modification, and relative predictability) are mutually
reinforcing, but individually sufficient for Proposition 1: even if management proposals were
not modifiable, shareholder proposals could be withdrawn, or prediction errors were equal,
the qualitative result would hold.
Under our management-driven model of influence, business ties influence the proxy vot-
ing of blockholders with business ties only when management chooses to exert influence.
Proposition 1 implies that the frequency with which blockholders with business ties vote
pro-management is higher among shareholder proposals than among management proposals,
ceteris paribus.22 The model therefore delivers the following hypothesis, which also provides
a foundation for our findings in Section II.
Hypothesis 1: The association between business ties and proxy voting should be stronger
for shareholder proposals than for management proposals.
While our initial findings in Section II are consistent with this hypothesis, we provide a more
robust and direct examination of this hypothesis in Section IV.
Our framework delivers an additional key implication. Managers exert influence only
for contestable proposals, regardless of sponsorship. When combined with Proposition 1,
we have that the class of proposals for which managers exert influence with the highest
probability are contestable shareholder proposals. While it is difficult to observe ex ante
contestability, our model links ex ante contestability and ex post outcomes: contestable
proposals pass or fail by no more than the size of prediction noise. This leads to our second
hypothesis.
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Hypothesis 2: The association between business ties on proxy voting should be strongest
for shareholder proposals that pass or fail by relatively small margins.
In Section V, we extend the methodology of Section IV to examine this hypothesis.23
IV. Shareholder and Management Proposals:
Empirics
To test Hypothesis 1 directly, we use difference-in-difference (d-i-d) specifications:
VoteswithManagementf,i,p,t = α + β1BusinessTiesMeasuref,i,t + β2LogHoldingsf,i,t+
+ β3BusinessTiesMeasuref,i,t × Shareholder i,p,t+
+ β4Shareholder i,p,t + β5ISSRecommendation i,p,t+
+ γi × µf × δt +

·
pizISS
pip︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fixed Effects Terms
+ εf,i,p,t.
(2a)
(2b)
(2c)
Our main independent variable is now the interaction between our business ties measures
and the dummy variable Shareholder i,p,t, which is equal to one if proposal p at firm i at time
t is sponsored by a shareholder and zero if it is sponsored by management. The estimate of
β3 provides us with the differential effect of business ties on voting between shareholder and
management proposals. In addition to using our full data set to investigate differences across
proposal categories, a key benefit of our d-i-d approach is that it allows us to better control
for unobserved heterogeneity. Within this framework, we can saturate the model maximally
by including firm×family×year fixed effects (γi × µf × δt) in all specifications, which allows
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us to focus directly on voting in a given firm×family pair in a given year. This is not feasible
in our original model (specifications (1a) to (1c)) because our explanatory variables there
(BusinessTiesMeasuref,i,t) are defined within the firm×family×year space.24 We use the
same proposal fixed effects as in Section II. The interpretation of the β3s in (2a) to (2c)
is therefore similar to the β1s in (1a) to (1c) except that we now compare across proposal
categories. For example, in specification (2c), β3 measures the difference in the effect of
business ties between shareholder and management proposals for a given firm×family×year
triple (e.g., Vanguard with holdings in Hilton Hotels Corporation in 2005) on voting over a
particular proposal (e.g., 6471494). Table
V hereThe results are reported in Table V. The estimate of β3 is positive and significant at the
1% level across all specifications and for both measures of business ties, providing robust
evidence in favor of Hypothesis 1. The coefficient on BusinessTiesMeasuref,i,t is dropped due
to collinearity with our firm×family×year fixed effects and hence is not reported. The coef-
ficient on LogHoldingsf,i,t is also insignificant, due to the fact that LogHoldingsf,i,t is highly
collinear with our fixed effects.25 Again, the coefficient on ISSRecommendation is positive
and significant, except in specification (2c), reported in columns 3 and 6, which includes
proposal fixed effects. For this specification, a shift from no business ties to some business
ties has a differential effect on shareholder proposals relative to management proposals of
increasing votes in favor of management by approximately 9%. Given that the unconditional
support of fund families for shareholder proposals is 64.09%, this represents an increase in
management support of 14%.26
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V. Contested Shareholder Proposals
To test Hypothesis 2, we first identify proposals that pass or fail by small margins.
The ISS Voting Results database provides us with the votes cast in favor of shareholder
proposals and the corresponding shareholder base for determining the outcome (e.g., shares
outstanding, votes cast, votes cast minus absentees). Using this information, we calculate at
the individual proposal level whether the votes in favor of that proposal were within 50±x%
of the corresponding base, for x = {10, 20}.27 If this is the case we call the proposal contested
at the x% level, effectively augmenting our set of proposal categories by two new entries,
which we refer to as “contested 10%” and “contested 20%.”
Prior literature has analysed contested 10% proposals (Listokin (2008)) as well as con-
tested 5% and contested 2% proposals (Cun˜at, Gine, and Guadalupe (2012)). Our con-
testedness levels overlap with this literature, but also broaden them. Tight bandwidths of
contestedness are essential for Cun˜at, Gine, and Guadalupe (2012) given their regression
discontinuity approach. Our focus is different: to test Hypothesis 2, we only need to identify
proposals that may appear contestable ex ante to management and thus on which managers
may exert effort to influence institutional shareholders. The relevant set of ex post contested
proposals therefore relies on the size of the prediction noise parameters
{
δM , δS
}
. If one or
both of these is not too small, somewhat higher bandwidths are justified.
Table I, Panel E shows that contested 20% (10%) proposals constitute 9% (4%) of all
proposals and 41% (21%) of shareholder proposals in our sample. Perhaps indicative of the
importance of these proposals, in Panel B of Table II we see a stark contrast in the support
for contested proposals across management, ISS, and fund families. Management supports
almost no contested proposals (0.06% for contested 20% and 0% for contested 10%), ISS
supports almost all of them (98.39% for contested 20% and 99.36% for contested 10%), and
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fund families are ambivalent (44.28% for contested 20% and 41.22% for contested 10%). Not
reported in the table is that the failure rate is 71% for contested 20% proposals and 66% for
contested 10% proposals. Tables
VI–
VII
here
Using the methodology of Section IV, we test Hypothesis 2 via an approach similar to
that in (2a) to (2c) in which our main dependent variable is now the interaction between
our measure of business ties and a dummy variable that is equal to one if proposal p at firm
i at time t is a contested proposal in the relevant category and zero if it is sponsored by
management. The results are reported in Table VI for contested 20% proposals and in Table
VII for contested 10%. The effects are positive and significant at the 1% level in all tables
and across all specifications. In specification (2c), reported in columns 3 and 6, for contested
20% proposals, the coefficient for the continuous measure is 0.970 and that for the discrete
measure is 12.528. The latter number indicates that a move from no business ties to some
business ties leads to an increase (relative to management proposals) in pro-management
voting of over 12% for proposals that pass or fail by less than 20%. Recalling that the
unconditional support for management in contested 20% proposals is 44.28%, it is plausible
that a change of this magnitude can affect the final voting outcome.
There is some latitude in how to test Hypothesis 2, which also predicts that the association
between business ties on proxy voting for contested shareholder proposals should be stronger
than for noncontested shareholder proposals. While the approach above has the advantage
of maintaining a constant control group throughout the paper, for completeness we also
reexamine Hypothesis 2 using shareholder proposals as the control group. To do so, we
restrict the sample to shareholder proposals and replace our previous interaction term by
the interaction between our business ties measure and a dummy variable that is equal to
one if proposal p at firm i at time t is a contested proposal at the relevant bandwidth and
23
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
zero if it is not. This approach significantly reduces our sample size, but nevertheless we
obtain significant results for contested 20% proposals. The results are reported in Internet
Appendix Table IV.28
Analyzing contested proposals allows us to focus on the conflict of interest confronting
mutual fund managers in the context of business ties and proxy voting. For a given fund
family, the probability of being pivotal in voting is higher for proposals that do not pass or fail
by a wide margin. Thus, for contested proposals, fund families may be aware that they can
influence the outcome. Further, the passage of a shareholder proposal can enhance the value
of a firm on the day of the vote, and in turn the value of the mutual fund’s portfolio, only
when the voting outcome is not fully anticipated by the market (Core, Guay, and Rusticus
(2006)). Proposals that are contested 10% or 20% may be less likely to deliver outcomes
fully anticipated by the market. In sum, it is for contested proposals that the trade-off
between value enhancement and business compensation is likely to be salient for the mutual
fund manager: voting to pass the proposal (against management’s wishes) is relatively likely
to enhance portfolio value (and thus benefit fund investors), but may also lead to a loss of
favor with company managers (and thus hurt the fund family’s future profits). The fact that
we find an incremental effect of contestedness on biased voting suggests that mutual fund
families choose business ties over portfolio value when it matters.
Our analysis of contested proposals also provides evidence against two potentially com-
peting interpretations of the association between business ties and mutual fund proxy voting.
First, while we already control for ISS recommendations, the analysis of contested proposals
underscores that the association between voting and business ties cannot be attributed to bi-
ased recommendations due to ISS’ business ties with corporations (Li (2013)): as mentioned
Table II, Panel B shows that ISS uniformly recommended voting in favor of contested 20%
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(10%) proposals, management uniformly recommended voting against, and funds voted in
favor of roughly half of these proposals. This analysis also helps to sharpen the interpretation
of our results. While we believe a natural interpretation of the association between business
ties and pro-management voting is a “quid pro quo” between company executives and fund
managers, an alternative interpretation may be that such ties provide enhanced information
transfer between companies and funds, leading to improved voting. However, management’s
uniform opposition to contested proposals, combined with the fact that contested proposals
are—on average—value enhancing (Cun˜at, Gine, and Guadalupe (2012)), implies that any
potential information imparted via business ties is not necessarily in the best interest of
shareholders.29
VI. Management Friendliness Without Business Ties?
In our conceptual framework and in motivating and interpreting the empirical analysis
that followed, we focus on the management origins of biased proxy voting: managers in
need of proxy voting support attempt to influence institutional investors to vote according
to management’s recommendation. In this context, the natural candidates to influence are
institutional investors with which the firm has nontrivial business ties since the existence
of such relationships enhances the potential for communication and creates opportunities to
threaten credible punishment. But could the desirability of revenues from future business
ties lead funds without business ties to vote in a more pro-management manner? In other
words, is pro-management voting principally demand-driven (induced by management in
need of voting support), supply-driven (generated by fund families voluntarily offering their
services), or both? Table
VIII
here
One way to potentially identify fund families that are unlikely to engage in voluntary
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biased voting is to use their size. Business ties are principally awarded to the largest fund
families. In Table VIII we document the association between a fund family’s size and the
total amount of business ties it receives. We use two measures of fund size: a continuous mea-
sure, LogTotalAUM f,t = Log
∑
i Holdingsf,i,t, and a discrete measure, LargeFamilyf , which
is set to one for an above-median-size family (according to
∑
t LogTotalAUM f,t) and zero
otherwise. For the total amount of business ties we use the logarithm of aggregate total com-
pensation a fund family receives across all firms per year, LogAggregateCompensationf,t =
Log
∑
i TotalCompensationf,i,t, the total number of business contracts a fund family has per
year, NumberofContractsf,t, and the logarithm of aggregate total compensation per con-
tract and year, Log
AggregateCompensationf,t
NumberofContractsf,t
. Across all definitions, there is a strong association
between fund family size and aggregate business ties. Table
IX
here
If smaller fund families are less likely to get contracts anyway, they should arguably
have lower incentives to engage in gratuitous management appeasement. To investigate this
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conjecture, we run:
VoteswithManagementf,i,p,t = α + β1BTDummyf,i,t + β2LogHoldingsf,i,t+
+ β3Shareholder i,p,t + β4LargeFamilyf+
+ β5Shareholder i,p,t × BTDummyf,i,t+
+ β6BTDummyf,i,t × LargeFamilyf+
+ β7Shareholder i,p.t × LargeFamilyf+
+ β8Shareholder i,p,t × BTDummyf,i,t × LargeFamilyf+
+ β9ISSRecommendation i,p,t+
+ γi × µf × δt +

·
pizISS
pip︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fixed Effects Terms
+ εf,i,p,t.
(3a)
(3b)
(3c)
This is similar to (2a) to (2c) in Section IV for the discrete business ties measure but we add
an extra difference with respect to the size of the fund family. Fixed effects are exactly as
in (2a) to (2c). The results are presented in Table IX.
The coefficient on the interaction between shareholder proposals, the presence of business
ties, and above-median fund family size (Shareholder i,p,t × BTDummyf,i,t × LargeFamilyf )
measures the effect of moving from no business ties to some business ties on the voting of a
large family relative to a small family in voting on shareholder proposals relative to manage-
ment proposals (for the same firm×family×year triple). Our estimates for this coefficient are
significant (e.g., the specification in column 3 delivers an estimate of 11.9%, significant at
the 5% level) and larger than the corresponding estimate for the average size fund in Table
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V.30
This evidence is consistent with the association between size and business ties docu-
mented in Table VIII: if large fund families are more likely to be pro-management than
small funds when they are endowed with business ties, corporations would find it in their
interest to award business ties to large families. The evidence is also consistent with the
demand-driven process for biased proxy voting built into our conceptual framework: if a
corporation has business ties with multiple fund families, then assuming that larger families
have higher holdings, managers are more likely to lean on the largest families to vote with the
management recommendation. Finally, this evidence is also consistent with smaller families
perceiving a lower level of benefit from signalling management friendliness, along the lines
discussed above: if they are unlikely to get future business ties (from other corporations)
anyway, it is less worthwhile for them to vote pro-management on a given proposal.31
A different way to examine the possibility of supply-driven pro-management voting is
to compare the management friendliness of large and small fund families that do not have
business ties, captured by the coefficient on the Shareholder i,p.t × LargeFamilyf term. A
positive and significant value for this coefficient would suggest that large fund families vote
more pro-management even without business ties in comparison to small families because
they are more likely to obtain business ties as future rewards. We find no statistically
significant support for this hypothesis.
Our findings are consistent with the primacy of a demand-driven process for pro-management
voting. This, in turn, suggests that there is something special about incumbency that makes
it feasible to support biased voting. One possible explanation is simple: a fund family that
voluntarily engages in pro-management voting even in the absence of business ties effectively
adopts a risky strategy. Since its actions are voluntary, and therefore unilateral, it cannot
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know how many other funds (including the incumbent holders of business ties) are doing the
same. Thus, the rewards for management friendliness are quite uncertain. For an incumbent
fund family, however, the risks are more to the downside: displeasing managers leaves it
directly exposed to punishment. Indeed, management can directly and immediately punish
only incumbent funds. The issue of demand-driven versus supply-driven pro-management
voting is related to the issue of correlation versus causality, which we discuss next.
VII. Correlation versus Causality
In Sections II, IV, and V, we document a significant association between pro-management
voting and business ties. The degree of saturation provided by our specifications leaves
little room for omitted variables. However, while we present suggestive evidence in Section
VI consistent with a demand-driven process for biased proxy voting, it is clear that our
regressions cannot formally separate whether business ties cause pro-management voting
(i.e., fund families are averse to losing the rents derived from business ties with plan sponsors
and thus vote with management) or pro-management voting causes business ties (i.e., firm
executives reward funds that vote with management with increased business ties). At the
broadest level, we are agnostic about the precise direction of causality: in our view, both
manifestations have qualitatively similar negative economic consequences. Figures
1–2
here
One way to informally capture the direction of causality is encapsulated in Figures 1 and
2. The figures show a sharp increase in pro-management voting by plan providers in the
year following the establishment of business ties (Figure 1) and a measurable decline in the
year following their termination (Figure 2). Table
X hereTo further examine the story suggested by Figures 1 and 2, we proceed as follows. First,
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we define a measure of “management friendliness” for fund families as follows:
AverageproManagementVotingf,i,t =
∑P (i,t)
p=1 VoteswithManagementf,i,p,t
P (i, t)
,
where P (i, t) is the total number of shareholder proposals that fund family f votes on at
time t in firm i.32 We then estimate the following specification:
BusinessTiesMeasuref,i,t = α + β1AverageproManagementVotingf,i,t−1
+ β2BusinessTiesMeasuref,i,t−1 + β3LogHoldingsf,i,t−1
+ Fixed Effects Terms + εf,i,t,
where BusinessTiesMeasuref,i,t can be either the continuous LogTotalCompensationf,i,t or the
discrete BTDummyf,i,t. Since all these variables are in the firm×family×year dimension, we
now collapse our data in this dimension. We use firm×family fixed effects to exploit only
the heteregoneity in the time dimension as in our graphs. Further, we include the lagged
version of the dependent variable as a control variable, together with the lagged version of
our main independent variable, thus generating a (pseudo) Granger causality test.33 The
results are in Table X, Panel A. Across all specifications, the coefficient of interest β1 is very
small and insignificant. The results suggest that lagged average pro-management voting in
shareholder proposals is not associated with increased business ties.
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Using the same sample and the same fixed effects, we next run:
AverageproManagementVotingf,i,t = α + β1AverageproManagementVotingf,i,t−1+
+ β2BusinessTiesMeasuref,i,t−1+
+ β3LogHoldingsf,i,t−1+
+ Fixed Effects Terms + εf,i,t.
The results are reported in Table X, Panel B. The coefficient of interest β2 is now positive and
significant, suggesting that lagged business ties are associated with higher pro-management
voting.34
While we reiterate that without some exogenous event, the direction of causality cannot
be well identified, these results are consistent with business ties leading management friend-
liness, and not vice versa. They are also consistent with the demand-driven story envisaged
in our conceptual framework and supported by the suggestive evidence in Section VI.35
VIII. Conclusion
The relevance of mutual funds to retail investors via their role in managing retirement
accounts and to corporate governance via their role as blockholders in many major corpo-
rations makes their proxy voting an issue of significant importance. However, mutual funds
also have business relationships with the firms in which they are blockholders. In this paper
we examine the extent to which these business ties influence the proxy voting behavior of
mutual funds.
Using data from 2003 to 2011, we provide evidence that the voting of mutual funds
is significantly influenced by their business ties with portfolio firms. Our results stand in
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contrast to prior literature and hold for arbitrary pairs of fund families and firms, even at the
level of individual proposals, and after controlling for ISS recommendations and holdings.
The association is insignificant for management proposals and significant for shareholder
proposals. We explain this heterogeneity by developing a simple model of management
influence over proxy voting that predicts that, as a result of the higher degree of control
enjoyed by managers over self-sponsored proposals, business ties are likely to be less relevant
for proxy voting on management proposals than for shareholder proposals. The model also
predicts that the association between business ties and proxy voting will be more pronounced
for proposals that pass or fail by a relatively narrow margin. These two key predictions are
supported by an empirical examination via multiple difference-in-difference specifications
that robustly control for unobserved heterogeneity by including fixed effects at the level of
individual firm, family, and year triples.
Further, we find that large and small fund families without business ties vote similarly,
whereas large fund families with business ties vote in a more management-friendly manner
than small families with business ties. We also find that lagged business ties are associated
with future pro-management voting, but not vice versa. Overall, our findings are consistent
with a demand-driven mechanism for biased proxy voting in which firm managers use existing
business ties with mutual funds to influence voting on proposals for which they fear defeat.
The importance of institutional investors as company stewards has steadily increased over
time as an ever greater share of corporate equity has come to be held via money managers.
This paper shines a spotlight on mutual funds, a particularly important class of money
manager. Our findings suggest that agency conflicts arising out of the existence of business
ties with portfolio firms, an important source of revenue for large mutual fund families, can
reduce mutual funds’ effectiveness as company stewards. At the broadest level, therefore,
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our paper highlights how agency frictions arising in the asset management sector may affect
the nature of corporate governance.
Initial submission: August 12, 2014; Accepted: September 16, 2015
Editor: Kenneth Singleton
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: If SA >
1
2
+ δ, and management goes forward with a proposal, their
payoff from exerting influence is v − kp(SA), the benefit of the proposal passing net of the
cost of influence, while from not exerting influence is v since the proposal is a sure thing,
and passes anyway. If SA <
1
2
− δ, and management goes forward with a proposal, their
payoff from exerting influence is −kd − kp(SA), since influence cannot alter the outcome on
a lost cause, while from not exerting influence is −kd, since the proposal is a lost cause.
Thus, in neither of these cases will influence be exerted. If SA =
1
2
, and management chooses
to go ahead with an unmodified proposal, the payoff from exerting influence is v − kp
(
1
2
)
,
since exerting influence guarantees the passage of contestable proposals, whereas the payoff
from not exerting influence is 1
2
(v) + 1
2
(−kd) corresponding to the events that  > 0 and
 < 0 respectively. Thus, management will exert influence only if the proposal is sufficiently
valuable, that is, v ≥ 2kp
(
1
2
) − kd. When v ≥ 2kp (12) − kd, managers will sometimes find
it in their interest to modify the proposal upon going forward. This is because, conditional
on v ≥ 2kp
(
1
2
) − kd, the payoff from not modifying is (by backward induction) v − kp (12),
whereas the payoff from modifying is (1−m)v. Thus, managers will prefer to modify (thus
eliminating the need to persuade) whenever (1−m)v > v − kp
(
1
2
)
, that is, v <
kp( 12)
m
. Note
that since m < 1
2
,
kp
(
1
2
)
m
> 2kp
(
1
2
)
> max
(
0, 2kp
(
1
2
)
− kd
)
.
Thus, for v >
kp( 12)
m
, managers will take forward an unmodified proposal and exert influence.

Proof of Lemma 2: Exerting negative influence is without value in sure things or lost causes.
For contestable proposals, if managers exert negative influence, they neutralize the share-
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holder proposal, resulting in no reduction in payment but incurring the cost kp(
1
2
). If they do
not, then their expected payoff is 1
2
(v − kd) + 12 (0), reflecting respectively the case in which
 < 0 (so the proposal passes and the managers receive payoff v, a negative number, and
simultaneously lose face via defeat in a proposal they opposed, resulting in a further cost kd)
and the case in which  > 0, so that the proposal fails without the exertion of influence and
the managers’ payoffs are unchanged. Accordingly, they will exert negative influence on a
proposal they oppose as long as 1
2
(v − kd) < −kp(12), that is, if v < −
(
2kp(
1
2
)− kd
)
. 
Proof of Proposition 1: Influence is exerted on management-sponsored proposal with prob-
ability (
G
(
1
2
+ δM
)
−G
(
1
2
− δM
))[
1−H
(
kp(
1
2
)
m
)]
,
whereas for shareholder-sponsored proposals influence is exerted with probability
(
G
(
1
2
+ δS
)
−G
(
1
2
− δS
))
H (− (2kp(c)− kd)) .
Since δS ≥ δM , it follows that G (1
2
+ δS
) − G (1
2
− δS) ≥ G (1
2
+ δM
) − G (1
2
− δM). The
symmetry of h (·) implies that H (− (2kp(12)− kd)) = 1 −H (2kp(12)− kd), whereas m < 12
implies that
kp(
1
2
)
m
> 2kp(
1
2
) > 2kp(
1
2
)− kd, so that H (− (2kp(c)− kd)) > 1−H
(
kp(
1
2
)
m
)
. 
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Table I
Summary Statistics I
All numbers are for our full sample (2003 to 2011). The units of the reported numbers in
each panel are given in parentheses at the end of the panel’s heading. Panel A: General
characteristics of our merged data set, including data on mutual fund votes reported in ISS
Voting Analytics, business relationships of mutual funds with firms reported in DOL Forms
5500, and holdings data at the family level from Forms 13F. Panel B: Number of proposals
(and their percentage in parentheses) per category: management, shareholder, and contested
as explained in Section VI. In Panels C to G we report statistics for several variables that
we use for most of our analysis. Panel C: Percentage of votes with management. This is our
main independent variable as defined in Section III. If all funds in a particular family vote
with management’s recommendation to a particular proposal, then this number is 100. Votes
pertaining to all proposals in our sample are equally weighted, that is, these numbers are for
one vote per fund family. Voting behavior at the fund family level across different proposal
categories appears in Table II, Panel B. Panel D: Total compensation at the fund family level.
This is our main independent variable, and is the sum of direct compensation (referred to
as “salary” prior to 2009), indirect compensation (referred to as “fees” prior to 2009), and
assets under management (AUM) divided by 200 for each fund in a family. As reported,
for 96% of sample observations we do not have compensation data. The numbers reported
here are for the observations with nonmissing compensation data. Panel E: Holdings of fund
families in portfolio firms. Panels D & E are equally weighted, that is, one firm×family pair
per year. Panel F: Contribution of business ties to a fund family’s revenue per year defined as∑
i TotalCompensationf,i,t/
∑
i
(
TotalCompensationf,i,t + Holdingsf,i,t/200
)
, where we posit
a 0.5% expense ratio on the assets under management (AUM) of each fund family. Panel
F employs only those fund family–year pairs in which a family had at least one business
relationship in the corresponding year. Panel G: Number of funds per fund family voting for
a particular proposal before we collapse the voting data along the fund family dimension.
Panel A: General Characteristics (no.)
Observations (votes cast by funds) 1131240
Observations (votes cast by fund families) 171473
Years 9
Firms 3121
Fund Families 29
Firms×Families 39944
Firms×Years 10026
Continued on next pageA
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Table I. Summary Statistics I — continued from previous page
Families×Years 191
Firms×Families×Years 89649
Proposals 17618
Proposal Type ISS 257
Proposal Type MX 12
Proposal Type ISS×Years 1136
Proposal Type MX×Years 93
Panel B: Proposal Categories (no.)
Management (sponsored) Proposals 13847 (79% of all proposals)
Shareholder (sponsored) Proposals 3771 (21% of all proposals)
Contested 20% Shareholder Proposals 1549 (41% of srh. proposals, 9% of all proposals)
Contested 10% Shareholder Proposals 784 (21% of srh. proposals, 4% of all proposals)
Panel C: Votes with Management (%)
Mean 77.12
Median 100
Standard Deviation 40.9
Interquartile Range (75%-25%) 14.29
Neither zero, nor 100 5.6%
Panel D: Total Compensation (million $)
Mean 2.25
Median 0.22
Standard Deviation 15.45
Interquartile Range (75%-25%) 0.84
Nonzero 4.1%
Panel E: Holdings (million $)
Mean 101.07
Continued on next pageA
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Table I. Summary Statistics I — continued from previous page
Median 11.5
Standard Deviation 393.79
Interquartile Range (75%-25%) 48.53
Panel F: Business Ties / Total Revenue (%)
Mean 13.94
Median 4.17
Standard Deviation 22.42
Interquartile Range (75%-25%) 13.91
Panel G: Funds per family (no.)
Mean 14.94
Median 11
Standard Deviation 13.05
Interquartile Range (75%-25%) 14
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Table II
Summary Statistics II
Panel A: The top 5 business relationships and their corresponding service codes in paren-
theses, as reported in DOL Form 5500 - Schedule C. This sample corresponds to the 2003
to 2008 period since reporting of business relationships changed in 2009. For each business
relationship we report the constituents of total compensation (direct, indirect, AUM/200),
as well as their sum (total compensation). Compensation data are reported in the form
mean (variance). All compensation data are for the nonmissing sample. Panel B: Voting
behavior as a percentage of appearance in the sample for different categories of proposals
(all, management, shareholder, contested 20%, and contested 10%). Rows pertaining to
fund families are averaged across all fund families. Rows pertaining to management and ISS
are (nonbinding) recommendations on how shareholders should vote on proposals. Panel
C: Distribution of voting results. Results in years pertain to the frequency of say-on-pay
proposals.
Panel A
Top 5 Business
Relationships (87%)
Direct
Comp. (th.$)
Indirect
Comp. (mil.$)
AUM/200
(mil.$)
Tot. Comp.
(mil.$)
Contract Admin. (12) 7.42 ( 273.27) 1.23 (25.2) 4.34 (21.3) 5.58 (35.9)
Recordkeeping (24) 0 (0) 6.40 (3.30) 1.37 ( 13.2) 2.01 (15.2)
Investment Mgmt. (21) 13.35 (51.63) 3.26 (7.07) 6.23 (52.4) 9.51 (58.5)
Trustee (corporate) (26) 38.06 (443.38) .65 (1.85) .74 (1.43) 1.43 (2.74)
Investment advisory (20) 0 (0) 7.17 (6.94) 15.2 (16.4) 22.4 (23.2)
Panel B
Voting Behavior (%) All Mgmt. Srh. Cont.
20%
Cont.
10%
Management recommends yes 78.64 99.86 0.72 0.06 0
ISS recommends yes 80.13 84.76 63.11 98.39 99.36
ISS agrees with mgmt. recommendation 74.61 84.73 37.44 1.68 0.64
Fund family votes yes 68.58 82.97 36.32 55.76 58.79
Fund family votes with mgmt. recommendation 77.12 82.94 64.09 44.28 41.22
Fund family votes with ISS recommendation 82.16 87.20 70.87 56.49 58.94
Panel C
Vote Result Frequency Percent Cumulative
Pass 14260 81.12 81.12
Fail 3310 18.83 99.95
Not Disclosed 3 0.02 99.97
One Year 3 0.02 99.99
Three Years 1 0.01 99.99
Withdrawn 1 0.01 100
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Table III
Effect of Business Ties on Voting (All Proposals)
The dependent variable is the percentage of votes with management at the fund family level
on a 0 to 100 scale. The regression is run over all proposals. The main independent vari-
able is either the (natural) logarithm of the total compensation of a fund family (“Log Total
Compensation”), which gives the extent to which business ties affect fund family voting with
management in all proposals (columns 1 to 3) or a business ties dummy (“BT Dummy”),
which gives the extent to which going from no business ties to some business relationship
affects fund family voting with management in all proposals (columns 4 to 6). The two
remaining independent variables are the (natural) logarithm of holdings of fund families in
portfolio firms (“Log Holdings”) and the ISS recommendation for a proposal (“ISS Recom-
mendation”). Firm×family fixed effects are used in all specifications. Extra fixed effects are
as reported. In particular, columns 1 to 3 and 4 to 6 correspond to specifications (1a) to
(1c) as explained in Section II. All regressions include an intercept, which is not reported.
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses, clustered at the family×year level. * Significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
All Proposals, 2003-2011
Votes with mgmt (0–100) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Total Compensation 0.222** 0.243** 0.212**
(2.100) (2.395) (2.103)
BT Dummy 2.342* 2.621** 2.214*
(1.831) (2.135) (1.829)
Log Holdings 0.658*** 0.633*** 0.556** 0.657*** 0.632*** 0.556**
(2.761) (2.815) (2.432) (2.756) (2.809) (2.428)
ISS Recommendation 51.187*** 47.542*** 51.185*** 47.542***
(15.626) (13.340) (15.625) (13.340)
Firm×Family F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Proposal Type ISS F.E. No Yes No No Yes No
Proposal F.E. No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 171,473 171,473 171,473 171,473 171,473 171,473
R2 0.557 0.586 0.641 0.557 0.586 0.641
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Table IV
Effect of Business Ties on Voting (Management versus Shareholder
Proposals)
The dependent variable is the percentage of votes with management at the fund family level
on a 0 to 100 scale. The regression is run over management (sponsored) proposals (columns
1 to 2) versus shareholder (sponsored) proposals (columns 3 to 4). The main independent
variable is either the (natural) logarithm of the total compensation of a fund family (“Log
Total Compensation”), which gives the extent to which business ties affect fund family
voting with management in all proposals (columns 1 and 3), or a business ties dummy (“BT
Dummy”), which gives the extent to which going from no business ties to some business
relationship affects fund family voting with management in all proposals (columns 2 and
4). The two remaining independent variables are the (natural) logarithm of holdings of fund
families in portfolio firms (“Log Holdings”) and the ISS recommendation for a proposal (“ISS
Recommendation”). Firm×family and proposal fixed effects are used in all specifications.
The coefficient on “ISS Recommendation” is dropped due to collinearity and hence is not
reported. In particular, all columns correspond to specification (1c) as explained in Section
II. All regressions include an intercept, which is not reported. Robust t-statistics are in
parentheses, clustered at the family×year level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%.
Mgmt. Proposals, 2003-2011 Srh. Proposals, 2003-2011
Votes with mgmt (0–100) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Total Compensation -0.067 0.353**
(-0.702) (2.274)
BT Dummy -0.739 3.917*
(-0.629) (1.964)
Log Holdings 0.713*** 0.714*** 0.304 0.306
(2.807) (2.809) (0.831) (0.834)
Firm×Family F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Proposal F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 118,569 118,569 52,904 52,904
R2 0.698 0.698 0.670 0.670A
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Table V
Effect of Business Ties on Voting (D-in-D Shareholder Proposals)
The dependent variable is the percentage of votes with management at the fund family level
on a 0 to 100 scale. The regression is run over management and shareholder proposals
using a differences-in-differences (d-in-d) specification. The independent variables include
a business ties measure (“Log Total Compensation” in columns 1 to 3 or “BT Dummy”
in columns 4 to 6) and a dummy variable indicating shareholder (sponsored) proposals
(“Shareholder”). The interaction of the two, “Shareholder×Log Total Compensation” or
“Shareholder×BT Dummy,” is our main independent variable and gives the extent to which
business ties affect fund family voting with management in shareholder proposals relative to
management proposals. The two remaining independent variables are the (natural) logarithm
of holdings of fund families in portfolio firms (“Log Holdings”) and the ISS recommendation
for a proposal (“ISS Recommendation”). Firm×family×year fixed effects are used in all
specifications. The coefficient on the business ties measure (“Log Total Compensation” or
“BT Dummy”) is dropped due to collinearity and hence is not reported. Extra fixed effects
are as reported. In particular, columns 1 to 3 and 4 to 6 correspond to specifications (2a) to
(2c) as explained in Section IV. All regressions include an intercept, which is not reported.
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses, clustered at the family×year level. * Significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Mgmt. and Srh. proposals, 2003-2011
Votes with mgmt (0–100) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Srh.×Log Total Comp. 0.782*** 0.644*** 0.710***
(3.759) (3.100) (2.952)
Srh.×BT Dummy 10.165*** 8.441*** 9.220***
(3.693) (3.060) (2.902)
Shareholder 3.819*** -15.676 -17.271 3.830*** -15.687 -16.864
(3.060) (-0.000) (-0.000) (3.068) (-0.000) (-0.000)
ISS Recommendation 52.477*** 46.954*** 32.720 52.477*** 46.954*** 32.703
(18.923) (15.200) (0.000) (18.921) (15.200) (0.000)
Log Holdings -0.222 -0.127 -0.118 -0.222 -0.126 -0.115
(-0.216) (-0.119) (-0.105) (-0.216) (-0.119) (-0.103)
Firm×Family×Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Proposal Type F.E. No Yes No No Yes No
Proposal F.E. No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 171,473 171,473 171,473 171,473 171,473 171,473
R2 0.743 0.762 0.788 0.743 0.762 0.788A
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Table VI
Effect of Business Ties on Voting (D-in-D Contested 20% Proposals)
The dependent variable is the percentage of votes with management at the fund family level
on a 0 to 100 scale. The regression is run over management and shareholder proposals con-
tested at the 20% level using a differences-in-differences (d-in-d) specification. The indepen-
dent variables include a business ties measure (“Log Total Compensation” in columns 1 to 3
or “BT Dummy” in columns 4 to 6) and a dummy variable indicating contested 20% share-
holder (sponsored) proposals (“Contested 20%”). The interaction of the two, “Contested
20%×Log Total Compensation” or “Contested 20%×BT Dummy,” is our main independent
variable and gives the extent to which business ties affect fund family voting with manage-
ment in contested 20% shareholder proposals relative to management proposals. The two
remaining independent variables are the (natural) logarithm of holdings of fund families in
portfolio firms (“Log Holdings”) and the ISS recommendation for a proposal (“ISS Recom-
mendation”). Firm×family×year fixed effects are used in all specifications. The coefficient
on the business ties measure (“Log Total Compensation” or “BT Dummy”) is dropped due
to collinearity and hence is not reported. Extra fixed effects are as reported. In particular,
columns 1 to 3 and 4 to 6 correspond to specifications (2a) to (2c) as explained in Section
IV. All regressions include an intercept, which is not reported. Robust t-statistics are in
parentheses, clustered at the family×year level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%.
Mgmt. and Cont. 20% Srh. Proposals, 2003-2011
Votes with mgmt (0–100) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cont.20%×LogTot.Comp. 1.000*** 0.901*** 0.970***
(3.598) (3.307) (3.032)
Cont.20%×BT Dummy 12.916*** 11.663*** 12.528***
(3.455) (3.180) (2.931)
Contested 20% 6.255** -19.148 -6.326 6.286** -19.085 -6.214
(2.473) (-0.000) (-0.000) (2.484) (-0.000) (-0.000)
ISS Recommendation 56.275*** 52.508*** 32.059 56.276*** 52.510*** 32.051
(16.644) (14.353) (0.000) (16.643) (14.354) (0.000)
Log Holdings -0.243 -0.096 -0.042 -0.241 -0.094 -0.035
(-0.207) (-0.078) (-0.032) (-0.206) (-0.077) (-0.027)
Firm×Family×Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Proposal Type F.E. No Yes No No Yes No
Proposal F.E. No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 140,842 140,842 140,842 140,842 140,842 140,842
R2 0.792 0.804 0.826 0.792 0.804 0.826
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Table VII
Effect of Business Ties on Voting (D-in-D Contested 10% Proposals)
The dependent variable is the percentage of votes with management at the fund family level
on a 0 to 100 scale. The regression is run over management and shareholder proposals con-
tested at the 10% level using a differences-in-differences (d-in-d) specification. The indepen-
dent variables include a business ties measure (“Log Total Compensation” in columns 1 to 3
or “BT Dummy” in columns 4 to 6) and a dummy variable indicating contested 10% share-
holder (sponsored) proposals (“Contested 10%”). The interaction of the two, “Contested
10%×Log Total Compensation” or “Contested 10%×BT Dummy,” is our main independent
variable and gives the extent to which business ties affect fund family voting with manage-
ment in contested 20% shareholder proposals relative to management proposals. The two
remaining independent variables are the (natural) logarithm of holdings of fund families in
portfolio firms (“Log Holdings”) and the ISS recommendation for a proposal (“ISS Recom-
mendation”). Firm×family×year fixed effects are used in all specifications. The coefficient
on the business ties measure (“Log Total Compensation” or “BT Dummy”) is dropped due
to collinearity and hence is not reported. Extra fixed effects are as reported. In particular,
columns 1 to 3 and 4 to 6 correspond to specifications (2a) to (2c) as explained in Section
IV. All regressions include an intercept, which is not reported. Robust t-statistics are in
parentheses, clustered at the family×year level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%.
Mgmt. and Cont. 10% Srh. proposals, 2003-2011
Votes with mgmt (0–100) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cont.10%×LogTot.Comp. 0.908*** 0.815** 0.913**
(2.638) (2.453) (2.418)
Cont.10%×BT Dummy 11.763*** 10.521** 11.856**
(2.606) (2.405) (2.385)
Contested 10% 3.786 -54.588 -10.218 3.812 -54.483 -10.048
(1.323) (-0.000) (-0.000) (1.330) (-0.000) (-0.000)
ISS Recommendation 57.171*** 53.267*** 33.350 57.170*** 53.267*** 33.349
(16.604) (14.319) (0.000) (16.604) (14.319) (0.000)
Log Holdings -0.370 -0.153 0.041 -0.368 -0.151 0.048
(-0.318) (-0.126) (0.032) (-0.316) (-0.124) (0.037)
Firm×Family×Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Proposal Type F.E. No Yes No No Yes No
Proposal F.E. No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 129,982 129,982 129,982 129,982 129,982 129,982
R2 0.817 0.825 0.847 0.817 0.825 0.847
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Table VIII
Effect of Fund Family Size on Aggregate Business Ties
The dependent variable is an aggregate, across all firms, business ties (BT) measure (e.g.,
“Log Aggregate Compensation”). The regression is run on the family×year sample. The
main independent variables are a measure of family size (continuous “Log Total AUM” or
discrete “Large Family”) that gives the extent to which family size affects aggregate business
ties. Year fixed effects are used in all specifications as explained in Section VI. All regressions
include an intercept, which is not reported. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * Significant
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Family×Year Sample, 2003-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BT Measure
Log Aggr.
Comp.
No. of
Contracts
Log Aggr.
Comp.
Contract
Log Aggr.
Comp.
No. of
Contracts
Log Aggr.
Comp.
Contract
Log Total AUM 2.019*** 7.482*** 1.591***
(10.479) (4.799) (9.612)
Large Family 6.634*** 27.857*** 5.163***
(7.291) (5.477) (6.521)
Observations 191 191 191 191 191 191
R2 0.497 0.227 0.443 0.322 0.169 0.285
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Table IX
Effect of Business Ties Dummy and Size on Voting (D-in-D-in-D
Shareholder Proposals)
The dependent variable is the percentage of votes with management at the fund family level
on a 0 to 100 scale. The regression is run over management and shareholder proposals using a
differences-in-differences-in-differences (d-in-d-in-d) specification. The independent variables
include a business ties dummy (“BT Dummy”), a dummy variable indicating shareholder
(sponsored) proposals (“Shareholder”), and an additional fund family size dummy (“Large
Family”). The interaction of the three, “Shareholder×BT Dummy×Large Family,” is our
main independent variable and gives the extent to which going from no business ties to some
business relationship affects fund family voting with management in shareholder proposals
relative to management proposals and in large fund families relative to small fund families.
The relevant double interactions are also included. The two remaining independent variables
are the (natural) logarithm of holdings of fund families in portfolio firms (“Log Holdings”)
and the ISS recommendation for a proposal (“ISS Recommendation”). Firm×family×year
fixed effects are used in all specifications. The coefficients on “BT Dummy,” “Large Fam-
ily” and “BT Dummy×Large Family” are dropped due to collinearity and hence are not
reported. Extra fixed effects are as reported. In particular, columns 1 to 3 correspond to
specifications (3a) to (3c) as explained in Section VI. All regressions include an intercept,
which is not reported. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses, clustered at the family×year
level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Mgmt. and Srh. proposals, 2003-2011
Votes with mgmt (0–100) (1) (2) (3)
Shareholder×BT Dummy×Large Family 10.735** 10.889** 11.913**
(2.237) (2.231) (2.220)
Shareholder×Large Family -2.739 -2.190 -2.262
(-0.525) (-0.417) (-0.411)
Shareholder×BT Dummy 1.356 -0.630 -0.682
(0.340) (-0.155) (-0.152)
ISS Recommendation 52.465*** 46.944*** 32.718
(18.890) (15.192) (0.000)
Shareholder 5.577 -14.148 -15.751
(1.354) (-0.000) (-0.000)
Log Holdings -0.214 -0.117 -0.101
(-0.207) (-0.110) (-0.090)
Firm×Family×Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes
Proposal Type ISS F.E. No Yes No
Proposal F.E. No No Yes
Observations 171,473 171,473 171,473
R2 0.743 0.762 0.788
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
Table X
Granger Causality
Panel A: The dependent variable is a business ties measure (“Log Total Compensation”
in columns 1 and 3 or “BT Dummy” in columns 2 and 4). The regression is run on the
firm×family×year sample. The main independent variable is the average, across firms,
vote with management of a fund family on shareholder proposals, lagged by one year
(“Lagged Avg. pro-mgmt voting (%)”), which gives the extent to which lagged average
pro-management voting of a fund family affects its compensation. The other independent
variables are the one-year lagged business ties measure (“Lagged Log Total Compensation”
or “Lagged BT Dummy”) and “Lagged Log Holdings.” Panel B: The dependent variable
is the average, across firms, vote with management of a fund family on shareholder propos-
als (“Avg. pro-mgmt voting (%)”). The main independent variable is the one-year lagged
business ties measure (“Lagged Log Total Compensation” or “Lagged BT Dummy”), which
gives the extent to which lagged business ties affect a fund family’s average pro-management
voting. The other independent variables are “Lagged Avg. pro-mgmt voting (%)” and “Log
Holdings.” In both panels, columns 1 and 2 have firm×family fixed effects, while columns
3 and 4 have additional firm×year fixed effects as explained in Section VII. All regressions
include an intercept, which is not reported. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses, clustered
at the family×year level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Panel A: Effect of Lagged Voting on Compensation
Firm×Family×Year Sample, 2003-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BT Measure Log Tot.
Comp
BT
Dummy
Log Tot.
Comp
BT
Dummy
Lagged Avg. pro-mgmt voting (%) -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(-1.136) (-1.051) (-0.536) (-0.527)
Lagged Log Total Compensation 0.134*** 0.151***
(3.331) (4.007)
Lagged BT Dummy 0.116*** 0.128***
(2.982) (3.513)
Lagged Log Holdings 0.038 0.002 0.054** 0.003*
(1.579) (1.298) (2.193) (1.848)
Firm×Family F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm×Year F.E. No No Yes Yes
Continued on next pageA
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Table X. Granger Causality — continued from previous page
Observations 14,653 14,653 14,653 14,653
R2 0.797 0.782 0.831 0.818
Panel B: Effect of Lagged Compensation on Voting
Firm×Family×Year Sample, 2003-2011
Avg. pro-mgmt voting (%) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Avg. pro-mgmt voting (%) -0.134*** -0.134*** -0.119*** -0.119***
(-9.639) (-9.632) (-7.793) (-7.779)
Lagged Log Total Compensation 0.339** 0.454***
(1.977) (2.720)
Lagged BT Dummy 3.736* 5.382**
(1.654) (2.443)
Lagged Log Holdings 0.429 0.430 0.372 0.376
(1.530) (1.534) (1.389) (1.404)
Firm×Family F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm×Year F.E. No No Yes Yes
Observations 14,653 14,653 14,653 14,653
R2 0.704 0.704 0.806 0.806
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Figure 1. Percentage of votes with management on shareholder pro-
posals around the time a business relationship was established.
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Figure 2. Percentage of votes with management on shareholder pro-
posals around the time a business relationship was terminated.
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Notes
1See Investment Company Institute (for the full 2013 Investment Company Fact Book,
visit http://www.ici.org/pdf/2013 factbook.pdf).
2Mutual funds have a fiduciary duty to vote proxies in the best interest of their investors
(SEC Rule 206(4)-6; Securities & Exchange Commission, “Final Rule: Proxy Voting by
Investment Advisers,” available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-2106.htm.)
3Securities & Exchange Commission, “Final Rule: Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies
and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment Companies,” available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8188.htm.
4We find that, even restricting attention to the proposals used by these two papers, there
is some association between business ties and pro-management voting between 2003 and
2011, suggesting that data availability is a relevant factor in the difference between their
results and ours. This analysis is reported in Internet Appendix Section I.A. The Internet
Appendix is available on The Journal of Finance website.
5Pension benefits typically include defined benefit pension plans, defined contribution
pension plans, and other plans. Welfare benefits typically include health/life insurance,
long-term disability, severance pay, etc.
6We exclude director elections and the ratification of auditors as we think it is difficult to
determine the value of the election of a particular director or auditor to firm shareholders.
For more details on voting on director elections, see Matvos and Ostrovsky (2010).
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7We thus effectively posit a 0.5% expense ratio. This is identical to the expense ratio
used by Davis and Kim (2007). In contrast, Cohen and Schmidt (2009) compute the average
of actual expense ratios, which turns out to be 0.76%. Our results are robust with respect
to using either expense ratio.
8Hence, p already includes firm i and time t since a proposal appears at a particular firm
at a specific point in time. In our notation, we supress this dependence.
9We provide details on the distribution of proposal categories in Internet Appendix Table
IA.I.
10We also run a variation in which we additionally control for time-heterogeneity by incor-
porating a Proposal Type ISS×year fixed effect. The results are similar. We do not report
these results as specification (1c) uses a proposal fixed effect, which supersedes a Proposal
Type ISS×year fixed effect, since in the same year there can be a vote on more than one
proposal of the same proposal type, across multiple firms or even in the same firm.
11Note that ISSrecommendation i,p,t is proposal specific and so the coefficient is dropped
from specification (1c), which incorporates proposal fixed effects.
12We also note that the coefficients are approximately 50% larger for shareholder proposals
than for all proposals across comparable specifications. The results across specifications (1a)
and (1b), when split across shareholder and management proposals, are qualitatively similar
to those for specification (1c).
13Some discussion in a report from an anonymous referee helped us enrich and crystalize
our thinking on the framework presented here. We very gratefully acknowledge the referee’s
input.
55
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
14In the body of the paper, we use OLS throughout. Apart from the fact that, as em-
phasized above, our main independent variable is not binary, our choice is informed by the
simplicity and practicality of the linear model, which gives consistent and easily interpretable
estimates under a broader set of conditions and requires less restrictive assumptions about
the error term.
15Management payoffs should be understood to include the total payoffs enjoyed by firm
insiders, including any potential component of payoffs that are actually aligned with those
of outsiders through, for example, restricted stock grants.
16In standard models of corporate governance, outsiders can increase their payoffs (pledge-
able income) by reducing managerial agency rents, thus reducing insider (management) pay-
offs.
17Though a wide variety of assumptions would be consistent with our analysis, we assume
that if SA > 1−δ or SA < δ, the realized vote share is truncated, with the residual probability
mass accumulated at one or zero, respectively.
18We subsequently let this noise depend on the identity of the proposer—management or
shareholders.
19Formally, this amounts to restricting the pdf g to have a single mass point at 1
2
for
SA ∈
(
1
2
− δ, 1
2
+ δ
]
, with g
(
1
2
)
= G(1
2
+ δ)−G(1
2
− δ).
20It seems natural that it is more costly to influence institutional investors to vote with
management in contestable issues than in sure winners, that is, kp(
1
2
) > kp (SA) for SA ≥ 12+δ.
21As per the deadlines set out in SEC Rule 14a-8, management typically becomes aware
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of a specific shareholder proposal no more than 120 days before distributing proxy material
(potentially less so in the case of a meeting date change) and may thus have less time to
canvass carefully.
22For example, when V ∈ (2kp (12)− kd, kp (12) /m), managers never exert influence on
management proposals (generating no association between ties and pro-management voting)
but sometimes do so on shareholder proposals (generating an association). This is consistent
with the findings in Section II.
23Though the assumption of bounded prediction noise simplifies our analysis, Hypothesis
2 would hold even without it.
24We also ran our regressions for specifications (2a) to (2c) with a series of two-dimensional
fixed effects (e.g., firm×family, firm×year, and family×year). The results are similar.
25Holdings are reported quarterly and hence there is some, though limited, variation in
the holdings of a fund family in a firm within a year.
26As in Section II, we report in Internet Appendix Table IA.III a conditional logit estima-
tion of our main d-i-d specification, which again confirms the robustness of our findings.
27In our sample we only keep those proposals that require simple majority to pass.
28For robustness, in Internet Appendix Section IA.I.B, we also examine whether there is
an incremental effect of contestedness on management-sponsored proposals.
29Our goal of characterizing the association between business ties and proxy voting is
qualitative, but analyzing contested proposals allows us to provide a crude “back of the
envelope” estimate of quantitative magnitude. For contested 20% proposals, the percentage
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of pro-management voting by fund families with business ties is 56%, while for those without,
it is 43.23%. Thus, replacing a business tied fund by one without enhances the probability of
passage by 12.7%. Using the conservative estimate of Cun˜at, Gine, and Guadalupe (2012) for
value enhancement due to the passage of a contested proposal (130 basis points), eliminating
business ties could enhance firm value by as much as 16.6 basis points per contested proposal.
30For completeness, we repeat the same set of specifications for contested 20% proposals
and obtain similar qualitative results, which are reported in Internet Appendix Table IA.V.
31To complete the picture, we also check whether having large business ties (as large
families are likely to have) leads to more pro-management voting. To do so, we split the
BTDummyf,i,t into two dummy variables: (i) BTMedianDummyf,i,t, which is equal to one
if total compensation is greater than the median of positive total compensation, and (ii)
BTDummyf,i,t − BTMedianDummyf,i,t. Using these measures, we show that most of the
association between business ties and pro-management voting arises from the higher band
of business ties. These results are reported in Internet Appendix Table IA.VI.
32Given the absence of any link between business ties and pro-management voting on man-
agement proposals, we restrict attention to shareholder proposals in defining our measure.
33The qualifier “pseudo” is inserted because Granger tests are formally defined for time-
series data, whereas we work with a panel. However, as noted, we use fixed effects to ensure
that we only exploit heterogeneity in the time dimension.
34The measure of management friendliness introduced in this section is defined in firm×family×year
space. It is related to an analogous measure in Matvos and Ostrovsky (2010), which instead
averages with respect to proposals and firms. Our measure appears to be mean-reverting
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over time (Table X, Panel B), suggesting persistence in management friendliness within
firm×family pairs, which provides a potential lens through which to view the time persis-
tence in their measure.
35Note that even though the demand-driven story requires that managers are able to make
credible threats to influence institutional investors with whom they have business ties, the
empirical finding that lagged management friendliness does not predict business ties is not
evidence against the demand-driven story. The reason is that in equilibrium credible threats
do not usually have to be executed when they are effective.
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